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Empirical reports on scientific competition show that scientists can be
depicted as self-interested, strategically behaving agents. Nevertheless, we
argue that recognition-seeking scientists will have an interest in establishing
methodological norms which tend to select theories of a high epistemic
value, and that these norms will be still more stringent if the epistemic value
of theories appears in the utility function of scientists, either directly or
instrumentally.
1. INTRODUCTION
Although some aspects of scientific research have been thoroughly studied
from an economic point of view, little effort has been made until now
to illuminate, with the tools of contemporary microeconomics, one of
the most fundamental elements of the research process: the norms that
determine what hypothesis must be taken as the right solution to each
scientific problem. The problem of how to establish these methodological
norms has traditionally been considered as a topic for methodologists,
epistemologists or statisticians. Nevertheless, it is widely agreed that there
is no algorithm allowing to prove the truth or the falsity (not tomention the
relevance, or the verisimilitude) of any scientific theory under any feasible
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corpus of empirical evidence. Hence, the acceptance as certified knowledge
of a theory, model or datum by the members of a scientific community is to
a great extent a conventional decision, and hence, it always calls for some
collective criteria. We propose to study the choice of these criteria under
the assumption that the scientists who make this choice are in fact rational
agents, not less rational than consumers, entrepreneurs or politicians as
they are depicted by traditional economic models.
Some of the authors who have explicitly taken the emergence of
methodological practices as a legitimate explanandum for social science
have been those included in the so-called sociology of scientific knowledge
and constructivist programs. Nevertheless, in the first program (see, e.g.
Bloor 1976) scientists are seen as people driven by their class interests,
rather thanby rational choice. In turn, the secondprogram(seeLatour 1987;
Knorr-Cetina 1981) rightly considered scientists’ behavior as guided by
the pursuit of their personal interests, basically the search for recognition
among their peers. However, these authors derived from this conception
the idea that what is taken as certified knowledge is just the result of the
work of those scientists who have been more successful in assembling
resources and allies in favor of their views and projects. Neither of these
approaches leaves a relevant place for the working of methodological
norms as constraints in the process of theory choice, save asmere rhetorical
devices, having nothing to do with the objective value of knowledge.
Of course, these authors, being mostly sociologists and anthropologists,
have never tried to illuminate their discussions by means of economic or
game theoretical modeling. To our knowledge, the only two exceptions
where an economic analysis has been made of the epistemic properties
of some systems of scientific norms are Goldman and Shaked (1991)
and Kitcher (1993) but, in these models, the norms are imposed on the
scientific community “from above”, whereas in ours we will analyze those
norms which researchers would prefer to impose on themselves. Another
interesting economicmodel of some epistemic aspects of scientific research
is Brock and Durlauf (1999), but it deals with the choice of theories, rather
than with the choice of scientific standards.
In this paper we basically try to show the following: first, how the
pursuit of recognition by rational scientists can be an explanatory factor
for the choice of specific methodological rules; second, that the rules so
chosen will usually lead researchers to accept theories of high quality; and
third, that some common features of the rules actually used in science
show that researchers must also have an interest in the quality of the
accepted theories, besides an interest in recognition. Our general notion
of a methodological rule is that of a set of tests (that the proposed solutions
to a given scientific problem might pass or fail to pass), together with a
specification of what, or at least how many, of those tests an attempted
solution should pass in order to be taken as an acceptable solution. Stated
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differently: a methodological rule can be seen as the combination of a scale
(measuring, or at least ordering the possible epistemic values a theorymay
have, according to what tests it has overcome), and a point (or points) on
the scale separating acceptable theories fromunacceptable ones.We cannot
offer an explanation of what tests are considered as relevant by scientists
in the first place, or of the rules that tell how are tests appropriately
performed. The answer to these questions will depend on the details of the
knowledge accumulated in each scientific discipline (although we do not
disregard the fact that some relevant rational-c`hoice arguments could be
proposed in order to explain some general features of the choice of tests).
So, our objective in this paperwill be the second element ofmethodological
rules: why acceptable theoriesmust pass a specific number or combination
of tests.
Before entering into the details of our model, let us introduce,
as stylized facts, some general features of the working of actual
methodological rules, that will help us in the ensuing discussions:
(1) In empirical science, no methodological rule can prove the absolute
truth of any theory or hypothesis; it is not only that new tests
can always disprove the accepted theories, but rather that most
scientific statements are usually known to be false (they may contain
idealizations, simplifications, references to fictional entities, or even
empirical anomalies, i.e. known false predictions).1 In spite of this,
many statements are taken as acceptable solutions to scientific
problems.
(2) Acceptability is itself an ambiguous idea: a scientific statement can be
acceptable either in the sense that the members of a discipline take it
as the right solution to some problem, or in the sense that they take it
as worth being used as if it were right. In the first sense, the discipline
commands acceptance of the statement, whereas, in the second sense,
it just allows acceptance of it, often allowing simultaneously the
acceptance of different solutions. So, we not only find agreement and
dissent in scientific disciplines in varied proportions, but also cases
of consensuated dissent.2
(3) Notwithstanding the difference just indicated, for many scientific
problems often no acceptable solution (even in the weakest sense)
is actually discovered, and so these problems count as unsolved for
the relevant scientific community.
(4) Mature disciplines are characterized by the existence of a relatively
high consensus on how to determine (qualitatively, at the least) the
value of each proposed solution; this is one of the aspects of normal
1 Two classical references are Popper (1959), and Cartwright (1983).
2 See, e.g. Cole (1992).
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science, according to Kuhn. Revolutions, on the other hand, are
characterized basically by the transformation of that consensus into a
new one.3
The approach that will be pursued in this paper is a contractarian
one. By this we mean that methodological rules are seen as the result
of an agreement about the circumstances under which a scientific
statement becomes acceptable within a discipline (in either of the two
senses mentioned above). In this respect, our approach differs from
those that describe scientific order as the emergent outcome of some
market-like mechanism (see, e.g. Polany 1962; Radnitzky 1987; Hull
1988; for arguments against the metaphor of science as a free market
see Callon 1994; Wible 1998; Ma¨ki 1999). We will try to show, instead,
how researchers interested in their own reputation, and perhaps in other
epistemic goals, will necessarily have a preference for the establishment
of certain methodological rules over others, and hence, that a plausible
explanationof the existence of certain rules is that theyhavebeen chosenby
scientists according to this preference. In our simplified model, this choice
is made under a veil of ignorance, i.e. before knowing what hypothesis
is going to be developed by each researcher, and even before knowing
what problems those hypotheses will have to solve. This justifies two
important assumptions of our model: first, the expectation of success is
a priori the same for all researchers (or, at least, the rules will be chosen
according to the expectation of success of the average scientist); second, a
consensus exists on how to assess the scientific value of every hypothesis,
according to the tests each one has passed (since under the veil of ignorance
the specific nature of these tests is ignored, the epistemic value of each
hypothesis can be identified with the number of overcome tests, perhaps
weighting each test by the expectation of finding a theory which passes
it). Regarding this assumption, we recognize that the relative importance
that has to be attached to each test is often a hotly disputed question
within scientific controversies; but such disputations take place once the
specific tests (and usually several theories) are known, and refer, then, to
the question of where each theorymust be located on the scale of epistemic
values; the disputation presupposes that somewhere on the scale there is
already a threshold dividing acceptable from unacceptable theories. We
can draw an analogy with the case of law: the choice of a methodological
rule is comparable to the enactment of a law by a legislature, whereas the
disputations about the value of each test are more similar to trials, where
preexisting laws have to be applied.4
3 See Kuhn (1970), and chapter 13 in Kuhn (1977).
4 Other arguments regarding the pertinence of giving a separate explanation of the choice
of an epistemic value scale are given in Zamora-Bonilla (2002), which also presents an
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The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 presents the
fundamental elements of some possible inference rules. Section 3 analyses
the quality levels which would be optimal for researchers under the rules
described in Section 2. In Section 4 we extend the model by introducing
the assumption that researchers may not only have a preference for their
expected levels of recognition, but also for the epistemic quality levels
per se. In Section 5 we study some aspects of the collective choice of an
inference rule. In Section 6 we drop the assumption of preferences for the
epistemic value. Section 7 presents some concluding comments. Finally,
an appendix contains the proofs of the propositions.
2. THE MODEL
Let N = {1, 2, . . . ,n} be a finite population of scientists. Scientist i ∈ N
will develop a theory with epistemic value xi. The epistemic values of the
different theories are assumed to be i.i.d. random variables defined on +,
with density function f (x). The probability that the epistemic value xi is
no greater than a threshold x is given by the distribution function F (x) =
∫x0 f (x) dx. Denote by x the maximum epistemic value attainable by any
theory, i.e. the smallest value of x such that the probability of developing
a theory of quality superior to x is zero; or, formally, x = inf{x|F (x) = 1}.
If F (x) goes asymptotically to one, then x = ∞.
The scientific population N will select among the theories according to
an inference rule. LetT= {x1, x2, . . . , xn} be the set of theories (represented
by their epistemic values) developed by the scientists in N. For simplicity,
we assume that each scientist devises just one theory, and that all the
devised theories are different. For simplicity we consider that f (x) is such
that the probability of two theories having the same epistemic value is
zero. An inference rule is a choice operator of the form IR (T) ⊂ T. We
consider three possible types of inference rules. Specific rules of each type
will correspond to different choices of a minimum standard.
(i) IR1 (T) = {xi | xi = max j∈N{x j }, xi ≥ x}
(ii) IR2 (T) = {xi | xi≥x} and ∀j 
= i, x j < x}
(iii) IR3 (T) = {xi | xi ≥ x}
In words, IR1 means that a theory is accepted if no other theory has a
greater epistemic value and if it satisfies a minimum standard x. Inference
informal version of some of the models deployed here. On the other hand, philosophers
of science have developed several “rational reconstructions” of scientists’ epistemic
preferences (actual or ideal), which might be employed in this paper as interpretations of
our (uninterpreted) notion of epistemic value (see, e.g. Gillies 2000). In particular, Popper’s
idea of verisimilitude as the epistemic goal of science has led to an interesting research
program on this philosophical problem. See, e.g. Zamora Bonilla (1999).
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rule IR2, however requires that the theory is the only one that satisfies this
minimum. Finally, according to IR3, all theories that pass the minimum are
selected. The difference between IR1 and IR2, on the one hand, and IR3, on
the other hand, may roughly correspond to the two different concepts of
acceptability indicated in Section 1 (see stylized fact number 2). There are
arguments to defend each rule, but they are better discussed after knowing
some of the implications of adopting them, as seen in the next section.
Scientist i has a utility function of the form
ui (xi ) =
⎧⎨
⎩
u if {xi } = IR(T)
v if {xi , x j } ⊂ IR(T) for some j 
= i
0 if xi /∈ IR(T),
with u ≥ v ≥ 0 and u > 0.
The assumption that the epistemic values of the different theories are
assumed to be i.i.d. random variables deserves some discussion. Different
theoriesmayproposedifferentmodels to explain (approximately) the same
set of phenomena. Also, different theories may propose different models
to explain different (but not totally) sets of phenomena. In either situation,
it is not necessarily the case that one theory is right and the other is wrong,
even if they contradict each other; e.g. they may be particular cases of
a more encompassing theory yet to be discovered. Furthermore, it may
happen that two theories are logically equivalent, but that one of them
is more valuable (e.g. is simpler or provides a better intuition). Thus,
a high epistemic value of one theory does not necessarily imply that the
epistemic value of any other is low. One theorymay have some virtues, but
an alternative theory may also have other virtues. This way, the statistical
correlation of the quality of different theories may be hard to establish in
advance, which justifies our assumption that the epistemic values are i.i.d.
To put it in another way, if the epistemical value is identified with its
usefulness for solving problems, one simple way to define x is to make
it represent the number of problems that the theory may solve according
to the scientific community. Clearly, two different theories may solve the
same number of problems even if they are not fully compatible.
IR1, IR2 and IR3 represent three different types of inference rules. Our
work focuses on the choice of a rule within each type. We do not attempt to
provide a theory aboutwhen andwhya type of inference rule is chosen.We
use the three types because they all resemble the way theories are actually
selected. Depending on the particular problem and the actual stage of
development of a given science, one type may be preferred to another. In
our model this will represent what it means for the members of a scientific
community to have a solution to a problem. What our model allows for is
discussion of the value that any specific methodological rule may have for
those scientists.
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3. OPTIMAL INFERENCE RULES
The inference rules defined above are characterized by a parameter x. For
each rule the expected utility of a scientist depends on the value of x. It will
then be of interest to find the value that maximizes his expected utility.
Proposition 1. Under the inference rule IR1, scientists’ maximum expected
utility is un , attained at x
∗
1 = 0.
The reason why the threshold x∗1 = 0 is simple. Each scientist receives
a greater utility if his theory is accepted. With x∗1 = 0, all theories pass the
threshold, and then the probability of acceptance is 1n . If the threshold x
increases, there is a positive probability that each scientist’s own theory
does not pass the threshold, thus reducing the probability of being selected.
Notice also that x∗1 = 0 does not mean that ‘anything goes’ as a theory,
since the rule selects the theory with the highest value. As a consequence,
this rule has an interesting property, namely, that there is always just one
solution to every problem.
The expected epistemic value of the theory chosen under IR1 (denoted
by E(IR1)) is
E(IR1) = E
(
max
i∈N
{xi }
)
=
∫ ∞
0
nF (x)n−1xdx.
Where nF(x)n−1 is the density function of F(x)n, the distribution function
of maxi∈N{xi}.
Proposition 2. Under the inference rule IR2, the threshold that maximizes
scientists’ expected utility is x∗2 that satisfies x > x
∗
2 > 0 and F (x
∗
2 ) = 1 − 1n ,
giving an expected utility of un F (x
∗
2 )
n−1.
Corollary 1. x∗2 → x as n → ∞.
To gain insight as to why x > x∗2 > 0 see that if either x
∗
2 = 0 or x∗2 ≥ x,
then for each scientist the probability of having his own theory accepted
is zero (in the first case, because all theories pass the threshold, and, in the
second case, because no one passes it). Hence, a positive (but not too high)
threshold is necessary to maximize the utility. According to this rule, the
probability of having a solution for a given problem is
n(1 − F (x))F (x)n−1 = n1
n
(
1 − 1
n
)n−1
=
(
1 − 1
n
)n−1
.
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Observe that, if n = 2, this probability has a value of 0.5, and that it
converges monotonically to limn→∞(1 − 1n )n−1 = e−1. i.e. the probability of
obtaining a solution decreases with the number of scientists down to the
limit e−1.
Wecannowcompute the expectedepistemicvalueof the theory chosen
under IR2. Since there is a positive probability that no theory is chosen,
we have at least two options to calculate the expected epistemic value.
Denote by E (IR2 | IR2 = ∅) the expected epistemic value conditional upon
obtaining a solution, and by E (IR2) the unconditional expected epistemic
value, where the event in which no theory is chosen is identified with
having a theory with zero quality.
Propositions 1 and 2 imply that the minimum standard is greater
under IR2 than under IR1 (x∗2 > x
∗
1 ). However, it is interesting to note
that the expected epistemic value under IR2 may be lower or higher
than under IR1. Nevertheless, our simulations show that, for reasonable
distribution functions, E(IR2 | IR2 
= ∅) > E(IR1) whereas E(IR2) < E(IR1).
This is true if, for instance, x follows a uniform distribution. In the
Appendix, Example 1 shows the details.
Proposition 3. Under the inference rule IR3, if v is sufficiently smaller than
u, then the epistemic value x∗3 > 0 that maximizes scientists’ expected utility
solves (n − 1)F (x)n−2 − nF (x)n−1 = vu−v . If v is sufficiently close to u, scientists’
expected utility is maximized at x∗3 = 0.
Corollary 2. x∗2 ≥ x∗3 .
Obviously, the probability of having a solution under IR3 is higher
than under IR2 and lower than under IR1 (although the expected number
of solutions under IR3 is typically larger than under IR1). The optimal
utility level under IR1 is higher than under IR2
( u
n >
u
n F (x
∗
2 )
n−1). When u
= v, the optimal threshold under IR3 is x∗3 = 0, with Eu3 (0) = u > un , while
if v = 0, IR3 coincides with rule IR2, and x∗3 = x∗2 , with Eu3(x∗3 ) = Eu2(x∗2 )=
u
n F (x)
n−1. In any case, x∗2 is never lower than either x
∗
1 or x
∗
3 .
Tables 1 and 2 below summarize our findings.
I R3
I R1 I R2 v = u v → u v → 0 v = 0
x∗1 0 x
∗
2 > 0 0 0 0 < x
∗
3 < x
∗
2 x
∗
3 = x∗2
Eui un
u
n
(
1 − 1n
)n−1
u v Eu2 < Eu3 < v Eu3 = Eu2
TABLE 1
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x∗2 > x
∗
1 x
∗
2 ≥ x∗3
Eu2 < Eu1 Eu2 ≤ Eu3
TABLE 2
The facts that x∗2 > x
∗
1 and E(IR2 | IR2 
= ∅) > E(IR1) may be interesting
social arguments in favor of rule IR2 rather than IR1 in some situations.
Obviously, all else being equal, a higher minimum standard is socially
preferred.Whether the inequality E(IR2 | IR2 
= ∅) > E(IR1) presents a social
argument in favor of rule IR2 depends on the attitude of scientists. If IR2 
= ∅
implies that the scientific community will continue producing theories for
the problem at hand for one more period, and so on, until IR2 
= ∅, then,
eventually, the expected epistemic value under IR2 will be greater than
under IR1. On the other hand, if IR2 
= ∅ implies that the search for a theory
is abandoned, then the fact that E(IR2) < E(IR1) makes IR1 more attractive
socially (but then this must be balanced with the other fact that x∗2 > x
∗
1 .)
The differences between rules IR1 and IR2 correspond to different
degrees of a conservative attitude. Under rule IR2, the judgment is
suspended if there is more than one theory satisfying the minimum
requirements, and so, fewer scientific problems are solved and scientists
receive recognition less frequently. Hence, we can expect that scientists
who are fundamentally motivated by the pursuit of recognition will tend
to prefer IR1, and hence a null threshold (at least if they want to have
some theories accepted in the strong sense, for in general IR3 only allows
them to consider theories acceptable in the weak sense). The problem
is, of course, that the stylized fact number three of the scientific method
described at the end of Section 1 seems to entail that scientists do establish
non-zero thresholds. We suggest that this result should be interpreted as a
falsification of the assumption that scientists only care about recognition,
i.e. their utility function must contain some additional elements that make
it reasonable for them to establish a positive threshold for acceptable
theories. We explore this possibility in the next sections.
Before beginning this discussion, we want to notice that our inference
rules have both a family resemblance with the method of eliminative
induction, as well as significant differences with it. This method consists
in displaying all the conceivable solutions to a problem, and testing them
empirically until all of them, save probably one, become falsified (if all
are contradicted by the data, then some presupposition in the construction
of the hypotheses must be false.) Our rules, instead, establish ex ante a
threshold that acceptable theories must surpass, and it is only ex post
that it is known how many hypotheses happen to survive the proof.
Although it has been argued that eliminative induction is regularly used
200 JOSE´ LUIS FERREIRA AND JESU´S ZAMORA-BONILLA
by empirical scientists (see, e.g. Kitcher 1993), there are strong conceptual
arguments showing that, in fact, it can only work under extremely
restricted circumstances: first, in general not all conceivable hypotheses are
actually conceived; second, usually many falsified theories can be given a
second chance by making some ad hoc modifications to their assumptions;
and third, as we saw in Section 1, in many cases theories are taken as
acceptable even if they fail to solve all the relevant problems (or, more
strongly, even if they are known to be false strictly speaking). Our rules,
on the contrary, do not suffer from these problems, for they only demand
that scientists take into account the probability they have of devising a
good enough theory, and not the probability each conceivable theory has
of being true.Our thesis is, then, thatwhat is actually employed in scientific
research is something similar to the inference rulesdescribed in this section,
not eliminative induction properly understood, and that it has been the
similarity between both types of norms which has led some philosophers
to think that eliminative induction was the rule scientists employ.
4. PREFERENCES FOR THE EPISTEMIC VALUE
In this section we study the consequences on the optimal thresholds in
the inference rules examined above in the case scientists also care about
the epistemic value of the theories. There are, at least, two different
reasonable ways of introducing this kind of preferences. In one of them, a
scientist may derive more utility if his own theory has a higher epistemic
value, assuming the theory is accepted. Alternatively, in a second way of
modeling, preferences may have as an argument the expected quality of
the chosen theory. We favor this second approach. However, the problem
becomes very complicated in this case. In order to overcome this difficulty,
we propose a third way, namely, to introduce the value of the threshold
as an argument of the utility function. We see this way of modeling as a
compromise between what should be the case and tractability. Notice that,
by adopting it, we get that the higher the threshold, the higher the expected
epistemic value of the accepted theory, which is what we wanted.
Assume, then, that utility levels are differentiale functions u(x), and
v(x) with u(0) = u, v(0) = v, u′ > 0, and v′ > 0. Notice that if u′ and v′ are
very small for all x, u(x) and v(x) can be made arbitrarily close to u and v,
respectively. Now we can state and prove the counterparts of propositions
1–3 in the previous section. These new propositions are all about interior
solutions to the maximization problem where the second order conditions
for a maximum are satisfied. The comparison of corner solutions (x = 0 or
x ≥ x) is of limited interest.
Proposition 4. Under the inference rule IR1, if u(x) is as described above,
scientists’ expected utility is maximized at xˆ1 > x∗1 = 0.
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In Proposition 1 we saw that a low threshold increased the probability
of a given theory being accepted, thus increasing the utility of the
scientists. Now the low threshold also implies a smaller utility because
of the new preferences. The value xˆ1 is the result of these two opposite
forces.
An interesting normative consequence is the following. Recall (see the
proof in theAppendix) that, under inference rule IR1, the expectedutility of
a scientist if the epistemic value is x is given by Euˆ1 (x) = u(x)n (1 − F (x)n).
Suppose now that the threshold x for rule IR1 is chosen by a “science
manager” with the objective of maximizing some public interest regarding
the standards of accepted theories. In particular, suppose that thismanager
gets a utility of w (x) > 0, with w′ (x) > 0, if there is a theory that passes the
minimum quality x, and zero otherwise, then she will maximize a function
of the form U (x) = w (x) (1 − F(x)n). Therefore, if w (x) is proportional to
u(x), the manager’s problem will have the same solution as the problem in
Proposition 4. This has a nice normative interpretation. If scientists are left
alone, they will choose the same standards as the public (or the “science
manager” who represents the public’s interests in science), as long as they
value equally (proportionally) the quality of knowledge.
Proposition 5. Under the inference rule IR2, if u(x) is as described above,
scientists’ expected utility is maximized at xˆ2 > x∗2 .
The intuition behind this proposition is similar to that of Proposition 4.
As in the previous section, the utility level under IR1 is greater than under
IR2. For any threshold x, the utility in any case (having his own theory
selected or not) is the same, but the probability of having the theory
accepted is more favorable under IR1. It is interesting to note that we
have been able to establish xˆ1 > x∗1 and xˆ2 > x
∗
2 regardless of u (x) and u.
In general, we cannot establish a relationship between xˆ1 and xˆ2, as
shown in Example 2 of the Appendix.
Notice also that expected utilities are greater when scientists have
preferences for the epistemic value of the theory under either IR1 or IR2.
For instance, under IR1 the utility level of un (the maximum if u (x) = u)
can be attained if u (x) ≥ u just by setting x = 0. But since the maximum is
attained at xˆ1 
= 0, this means that the utility must be greater in this case.
The same argument can be made for IR2.
Under inference rule IR3, we need a stronger condition to reach a
higher threshold when adding preferences for the epistemic value of
theories.
Proposition 6. Under the inference rule IR3, if u (x) and v (x) are as described
above, if v(x)u(x)−v(x) ≤ uu−v for all x, and if both equations (2) and (6) in the
Appendix have only one solution for a maximum, then scientists’ expected utility
is maximized at xˆ3 ≥ x∗3 .
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By the same reasons mentioned earlier, we must have Euˆ3(xˆ3) ≥
Eu3(x∗3 ). To understand why we need the additional condition
v(x)
u(x)− v(x) ≤ vu− v to have xˆ3 ≥ x∗3 recall that, when u(x)= u and v(x)= v, x∗3
was positive or zero depending on whether v was close to zero or to u.
Now, even if v (0) is close to zero and not to u (0), it may occur that,
as x increases v(x) becomes closer to u (x) than to zero. This may make
xˆ3 = 0 even if x∗3 > 0. It is to avoid this situation that we impose the new
condition.
Consider the cases analyzed in Section 3, where scientists had no
preferences for the quality of the selected theory, and consider also any
rule that selects a theory at random from among the elements in T (any
rule that does not care about the epistemic value of theories and that is
anonymous can be considered random). In our model, this rule will serve
the same purpose as rule IR1 from the viewpoint of the scientists (there
will be one theory selected, and the expected utility for each scientist
will be un , the same as with IR1.) Obviously, if devising and performing
tests has a positive cost for scientists, the expected utility derived from
random selection will be higher than with IR1. One nice interpretation
of the results in this section is, then, that the assumption that scientists’
utilitiesdependon the epistemicvalueof the chosen theory (however slight
this dependence is, i.e. however close u(x) is to u) provides an explanation
not only of why scientists actually prefer a non-zero threshold, but also of
why they are willing to perform any tests at all. A similar argument can
be made for both IR2 and IR3.
One may criticize the introduction of the epistemic value of the
threshold x in the utility function on the basis that it is very close to
assuming what is intended to be proven, that scientists will opt for
theories with high epistemic value. However, notice that the utility of
scientist i is u(x), v(x), or zero depending on whether his theory is the only
one accepted, is accepted along with others or not accepted at all. This
leaves a great deal of room for possible situations in which what matters
is the strategic behavior to accept or not to accept others’ theories. For
example, each scientist might in principle decide to reject all the theories
proposed by her colleagues, no matter how valuable they are (arguing, for
example, that they are not well tested enough). Obviously, if all behaved
this way, they would get utility 0. What we have shown, so far, is that
every scientist has an interest in a certain methodological norm being
established, and that an optimal strategy for choosing the norm can be
that of using the epistemic value thresholds as a way of selecting among
theories.
The next section analyzes how this optimal value can actually be
chosen strategically by scientists. In Section 6 we drop the assumption
of preferences for the epistemic value and attach a practical value to better
theories as an alternative model.
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5. THE CHOICE OF THE INFERENCE RULE
For a given choice rule, we have detected the optimal threshold under
two scenarios. This does not mean that the scientific population will
immediately choose that value as the minimum epistemic value for a
theory to be acceptable. In fact, it cannot be even taken for granted that
the current members of the scientific community are always the ones who
make the choice. For example, they may have inherited certain inference
rules from their predecessors. In this section we show, however, that any
reasonable mechanism in which the set of decision makers is indeed the
scientific population has the optimal value as an equilibrium.
Assume, then, that the inference rule is fixed, that scientists select
the threshold value under a mechanism in which each scientist proposes a
value yi ≥ 0, and that thevalue chosenby themechanism is x= f (y1, . . . , yn).
Next are two interesting properties that the function f may satisfy. Let
y−i = (y1, . . . , yi−1, yi+1, . . . yn) and (y−i , y˜i )= (yi , . . . , yi−1, y˜i , yi+1, . . . yn).
(i) Unanimity (U): if y1 = . . . = yn = y, then f (y1, . . . , yn) = y, and
(ii) Influence of direction (IOD): for all y−i and x, if |yi − x| < |yˆi − x|,
then | f (y−i , yi ) − x| < | f (y−i , yˆi ) − x| if the sign of f (y−i , yi ) − x is
the same as the sign of f (y−i , yˆi ) − x.
Themeaning of unanimity is obvious: if all scientists propose the same
threshold y, then that threshold is adopted. Influence of Direction means
that, if the threshold proposed by scientist i (say yˆi ) is higher (alt. lower)
than a given epistemic value x and if an alternative threshold (say yi) is
even higher (alt. lower), then the value chosen by f must also be higher
(alt. lower) when yi is proposed than when yˆi is proposed regardless of the
values proposed by the other scientists.
Proposition 7 states that, under U, the optimal threshold is obtained
in equilibrium, and Proposition 8 states that, if IOD is added, then this is
essentially the only equilibrium. The reason is that if the equilibrium is
not xi, by IOD, there will be a scientist who can influence an outcome still
closer to xi and be better off.
Proposition 7. Under the mechanism described above, if f satisfies U, then
(y1, . . . , yn)= (x∗i , . . . , x∗i ) is a Nash equilibrium under rule IRi, with u and v
constant, and (y1, . . . , yn)= (xˆi , . . . , xˆi ) is an equilibrium under IRi, with u=
u(x) and v = v (x).
Proposition 8. If, in addition, f satisfies IOD, then, under rule IRi the only
equilibrium outcome is the optimal epistemic value or x > x¯.
Let xi be the optimal threshold under rule IRi, (xi = x∗i or xˆi , depending
on whether u and v are constant or not) then, when we require U and IOD,
the only equilibria imply f (y1, . . . , yn)= xi or f (y1, . . . , yn)> x¯. See that in
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the second case the required epistemic value is too high (recall that x¯ is the
minimum epistemic value such that F (x) = 1). I.e. the epistemic value is
either optimal or too high,which contradicts the extreme view in sociology
of science that suggests that the individualism of scientists does not imply
an optimal level, but rather, a too low epistemic value of theories.
There are at least two other ways of obtaining the same result. One
is to use a mechanism in which the threshold is decided by majority rule
and where Nash equilibria in (weakly) dominated strategies are ruled
out. If we allow for equilibria in dominated strategies, multiple equilibria
emerge, e.g. an equilibrium in which every scientist proposes the same
arbitrary threshold, as, in this case, unilateral deviations will not affect
the outcome of the majority rule. When weakly dominated strategies are
not considered, it is in the scientists’ interest to propose the best ex-ante
threshold, as calculated in the different cases.
The other way is to select x∗ as the outcome of a strong Nash
equilibrium. A strategy profile is not a strong Nash equilibrium if a
coalition of players can simultaneously deviate and improve their utility.
According to this definition, a collective deviation would take place
any time a threshold x˜i 
= xi is chosen. The concept of strong Nash
equilibrium was introduced in Aumann (1959). It has been shown to
be a very strong condition for an equilibrium to be immune against
coalitional deviations. There are many weaker definitions of equilibria
when coalitional deviations are considered, like the Coalition-proof Nash
equilibrium presented in Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston (1987). However
there is no need to go through this literature, as any strong Nash
equilibrium also satisfies these definitions.
We have shown, then, that under reasonable conditions, and given the
structure of the scientific community (number of scientists or scientists’
teams, rule of inference and preferences) therewill be no strategic behavior
of agreement on low standards for theory choice.
6. THEORIES WITH A PRACTICAL VALUE
In this section we outline an alternative to the model in Section 4 that
leads to the same results. Instead of assuming that scientists have direct
preferences for the epistemic value we will now assume that theories may
have a practical value which depends on the epistemic value.5 To this end,
suppose that there is an agent who wants to use an accepted theory to
guide her practical work. The theory has to have a minimum quality of,
say y, with y ≥ x. It is costly to look for scientific theories, so this agent
will just look randomly at one of the accepted theories and, if its quality
is not below y, will take it and pay z to hire the scientist who developed
5 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this extension.
AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF SCIENTIFIC RULES 205
the theory as a consultant. If the theory has a quality below y, the agent
abandons the search and does nothing of value for any scientist. There is
no other source of utility for the scientists.
Let P(y) be the cumulative probability distribution of y from the
scientists’ point of view. I.e. P(y) indicates the probability that the agent’s
requiredminimumstandard is smaller than or equal to y.Thus, for scientist
i the ex-ante utility of developing a theory with value xi can be defined as
ui =u(xi )= zP(x
i )
k
if ti ∈ IRi (T),
where k is the cardinal of IRi (T), and
ui = 0 if ti /∈ IRi (T),
where P(xi) = prob.(y ≤ xi ) indicates the probability that the theory
of scientist i passes the agent’s required minimum standard. The
accumulative function P(.) is increasing. If we assume further ∂P(y)
∂y > 0,
then we have u′ > 0, and the counterparts of propositions 4, 5, 6, and 8
follow for IR1 and IR2. So, the choice of a high epistemic standard may be
due not only to the scientists’ preferences for theorieswith a high epistemic
value, but also to the existence of some correlation between the epistemic
and the pragmatic values of theories.
7. CONCLUSION
We have developed an economic theory for the choice of epistemic
standards. Our model assumes only selfish, strategically behaving
scientists and, nevertheless, implies that theories satisfying stringent
standards will tend to be accepted, especially if scientists do not seek,
so to speak, the bare recognition of getting their theories accepted,
but the recognition for having devised a good solution to a scientific
problem (this refers to our assumption that, when their theories become
accepted, scientists receive a higher utility the higher the epistemic value
of their theories). The same conclusion follows if a high epistemic value
is instrumental for the attainment of other practical goals, for which they
may be paid. Hence, the fact that scientific standards are the outcome of
a social negotiation does not entail that scientific knowledge lacks real
epistemic value; on the contrary, under some reasonable assumptions, the
negotiation will lead to the establishment of very demanding scientific
norms. We can here draw an analogy with the case of sports: it is true
that the norms regulating, say, an athletic competition are the result of
a negotiation, and that athletes are basically driven by the will to win
and the pursuit of glory, but we cannot infer from this that the winners
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in the competition are not, objectively, much more qualified for those
competitions than the average person.
Obviously, our model does not prove that actual scientific norms
are systematically efficient, for our assumptions are just idealizations
attempting to capture some essential aspects of those norms, and not a
full empirical description of them. But what our model suggests is that,
in order to argue against the objective validity of some parts of scientific
knowledge, somethingmore is needed besides just pointing to the fact that
this knowledge is the outcome of a social negotiation: at the very least, an
argument should be offered showing that the scientific standards arising
from that negotiation are inefficient in a clear epistemic sense, i.e. that they
systematically preclude the acceptance of theories which are objectively
better than the ones actually accepted.
The model, of course, can be extended in several directions. Perhaps,
themost natural of them is the introductionof heterogenous scientists,with
differences in the probability of developing a theory of aminimumquality,
different preferences, or differences in authority within the community.
The study of theses extensions is left for a future work.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1. The expected utility of a scientist if the epistemic
value is x is given by
Eu∗1(x) =
∫ ∞
x
f (y)F (y)n−1 udy
= u
n
[F (y)n]∞x
= u
n
(1 − F (x)n).
The maximum of 1 − F(x)n is attained at x = 0. Since F(0) = 0, Eu∗1(0) =
u
n . 
Proof of Proposition 2. The expected utility of a scientist if the epistemic
value is x is given by
Eu∗2 (x) = (1 − F (x))F (x)n−1 u
= (F (x)n−1 − F (x)n)u.
First order conditions for a maximum are given by
((n − 1)F (x)n−2 − nF (x)n−1) f (x)u = 0.
As f (x), u > 0, this implies
(n − 1)F (x)n−2 − nF (x)n−1 = 0,
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or
(1) F (x) = n − 1
n
= 1 − i
n
.
See that the solution of this equation gives x∗2 > 0, unless n= 1, since
F(0) = 0. Substituting condition (1) in the objective function one gets
Eu∗2 (x
∗
2 ) = un F (x∗2 )n−1. 
Proof of Corollary 1. Straightforward. 
Example 1. Showing E(IR2 | IR2 
= ∅) > E(IR1) and E(IR2) < E(IR1): If
F(x) = x, then F(maxj {xj}) = xn, and f (max j {x j }) = nxn−1. Thus
E(IR1) =
∫ ∞
0
nxn−1xdx = n
n + 1 .
According to IR2, the chosen theory is also the one with the maximum
value. If this theory passes the threshold x∗2 , then it is distributed with
uniform probability between x∗2 and one if no other theory passes the
threshold. By (1) F (x∗2 ) = x∗2 = 1 − 1n . Therefore
E(IR2 | IR2 
= ∅) =
1 + (1 − 1n)
2
= 1 − 1
2n
.
It follows that E(IR2 | IR2 
= ∅) > E(IR1) for all n ≥ 1.
Finally, the probability of having one theory chosen under IR2 is(
1 − 1n
)n−1
, which means that
E(IR2) =
(
1 − 1
2n
)(
1 − 1
n
)n−1
.
To see that E (IR2) < E (IR1) notice that
(
1 − 1
2n
)(
1 − 1
n
)n−1
<
(
1 − 1
n
)n−1
< 1 − 1
2n
for all n ≥ 1.
Proof of Proposition 3. The expected utility of a scientist if the epistemic
value is x is given by
Eu∗3 (x) = (1 − F (x)) F (x)n−1 u + (1 − F (x))(1 − F (x)n−1)v
First order conditions for a maximum are given by
(
(n− 1)F (x)n−2 − nF (x)n−1) f (x)u+ (nF (x)n−1 − (n− 1)F (x)n−2 − 1) f (x)v
=((n− 1)F (x)n−2(u− v)− nF (x)n−1(u− v)− v)) f (x)= 0,
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which gives
(2) (n − 1)F (x)n−2 − nF (x)n−1 = v
u − v .
Equation (2) may have multiple solutions, one being the global maximum
x∗3 > 0 if v is sufficiently small. If v is close to u, the equation has no solution,
meaning that the expected utility is maximized at a corner solution, with
x∗3 = 0. 
Proof of Corollary 2. Notice that Equation (2) may be rewritten as
(3) F (x) = n − 1
n
− v
(u − v)nF (x)n−2 .
Since F(x) is non-decreasing and v(u− v)nF (x)n−2 > 0, the solution to
Equation 2 must be strictly smaller than the solution to Equation 1 unless
v = 0, in which case x∗2 = x∗3 . 
Proof of Proposition 4. The expected utility of a scientist if the epistemic
value is x is given by
Euˆ1(x) = u(x)n (1 − F (x)
n).
First order conditions for an interior maximum are given by the
equation
(4)
u′(x)
u(x)
= −G
′(x)
G(x)
,
where G(x) = 1 − F(x)n. Notice that the right hand side of (4) is zero at
x = 0 as G ′(0) = −nF (0)n−1 f (0) = 0 and G(0) = 1 − F(0)n = 1, whereas
the left hand side is always positive. This means that x = 0 cannot be a
maximum. 
Proof of Proposition 5. The expected utility of a scientist if the epistemic
value is x is given by
Euˆ2(x) = (F (x)n−1 − F (x)n)u(x).
First order conditions for a maximum are now given by
((n − 1)F (x)n−2 − nF (x)n−1) f (x)u(x) + u′(x)(F (x)n−1 − F (x)n) = 0.
As f (x), u(x), u′ (x) > 0 and F (x)n−1−F(x)n > 0 if x > 0, this implies
(n − 1)F (x)n−2 − nF (x)n−1 < 0,
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or
(5) 1 − F (x) < 1
n
.
See that condition (5) implies xˆ2 > x∗2 . 
Example 2. Showing no relation between xˆ1 and xˆ2:
Take the utility function u(x) = u + x 12 , and the uniform distribution
function F(x) = x when x ∈ [0,1] and F(x) = 1 when x > 1. When u → 0, the
value xˆ1 is calculated maximizing
Euˆ1(x) = x
1
2
n
(1 − xn),
with first order conditions given by
x
1
2 =
(
n + 1
2
)
xn−
1
2
and solution xˆ1 =
( 1
2n+ 1
) 1
n .
Under the inference rule IR2, the optimal epistemic value maximizes
Euˆ2(x) = (xn−1 − xn)x 12 ,
whose first order conditions are(
n − 1
2
)
xn−
3
2 =
(
n + 1
2
)
xn−
1
2 ,
resulting in xˆ2 =
( 2n− 1
2n+ 1
)2
.
When n = 3, xˆ1 = 0, 522 > xˆ2 = 0,51, whereas when n = 4, xˆ1 = 0,577<
xˆ2 = 0,604. By continuity, for small values of u the same inequalities will
hold.
Proof of Proposition 6. The expected utility of a scientist if the epistemic
value is x is given by
Euˆ3(x) = (1 − F (x))F (x)n−1u(x) + (1 − F (x))(1 − F (x)n−1)v(x)
First order conditions for a maximum are given by
((n− 1)F (x)n−2 − nF (x)n−1) f (x)u(x)+ (1− F (x))F (x)n−1u′(x)
+ (nF (x)n−1 − (n− 1)F (x)n−2 − 1) f (x)v(x)
+ (1− F (x))(1− F (x)n−1)v′(x)
= ((n− 1)F (x)n−2(u(x)− v(x))− nF (x)n−1(u(x)− v(x))− v(x)) f (x)
+ (1− F (x))F (x)n−1u′(x) + (1− F (x))(1− F (x)n−1)v′(x)
= 0,
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which gives
(6) (n − 1)F (x)n−2 − nF (x)n−1 = v(x)
u(x) − v(x) + H,
where
H = − (1 − F (x))(F (x)
n−1u′(x) + (1 − F (x)n−1)v′(x))
f (x)
< 0.
Equation (6) can be rewritten as
(7) F (x) = n − 1
n
− v(x)
(u(x) − v(x))nF (x)n−2 −
H
nF (x)n−2
.
When the maximum is attained at a corner solution, we have xˆ3 =
x∗3 = 0. Otherwise we can compare equations (3) and (7) to show that
xˆ3 > x∗3 . To this end notice first that F(0) = 0, F (x > x) = 1, 1 > n− 1n >
n− 1
n − v(u− v)nF (x>x)n−2 , and that n− 1n − v(u− v)nF (x)n−2 goes to –∞ as x goes
to 0. The maximizer x∗3 is given by the intersection of curves F(x) and
n− 1
n − v(u− v)nF (x)n−2 . Further, the second order conditions require that the
slope of F(x) be greater that the slope of n− 1n − v(u− v)nF (x)n−2 .
The right hand side of equation (7), n− 1n − v(x)(u(x)− v(x))nF (x)n−2 − HnF (x)n−2 =
n− 1
n − v(u− v)nF (x)n−2 at x¯ and also goes to −∞ as x goes to 0. However, for
all values x ∈ (0, x¯), we have that
n − 1
n
− v(x)
(u(x) − v(x))nF (x)n−2 −
H
nF (x)n−2
(8)
>
n − 1
n
− v
(u − v)nF (x)n−2 .
Second order conditions for xˆ3 to be a maximum require that the slope of
F(x) be greater than the slope n−1n − v(x)(u(x)−v(x))nF (x)n−2 − HnF (x)n−2 . This, together
with the uniqueness of themaximum and inequality (8) imply that xˆ3 > x∗3
(see Figure 1). 
Proof of Proposition 7. Straightforward. 
Proof of Proposition 8. Consider an inference rule IRi and a strategy
vector (x1, . . . , xn) such that f (x1, . . . , xn) = x 
= x∗, where x∗ is the optimal
epistemic value for rule IRi. By U there exists a scientist choosing xi 
= x∗.
If this scientist deviates to x∗ we have f (xi−1, (x∗)i ) = x′, with |x′ − x∗| <
|x − x∗|. By IOD and the fact that the expected utility function has unique
extreme points in the interval [0, x¯], the latter inequality implies a higher
utility except if x > x¯. 
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